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The Flood of Pregnancy Discrimination Cases:
Balancing the Interests of Pregnant Women
and Their Employers
Jennifer Yue'
INTRODUCTION
T HERE is a growing problem of workplace pregnancy discrimination
in our nation. The number of women claiming they have been
discriminated against on the job because they are pregnant is soaring even
as the birth rate declines.
"Pregnancy discrimination complaints filed with the federal Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) jumped 39% from fiscal
year 1992 to 2003. During that same time, the nation's birth rate dropped
9%.2 In 2003, the nation's birth rate fell to a record low as both women and
teenagers in their prime childbearing years had fewer babies. 3 Despite
this, "[t]he surge in pregnancy discrimination complaints makes it one of
the fastest-growing types of employment discrimination charges filed with
the EEOC--outpacing the rise in sexual harassment and sex discrimination
claims. '
"The increasing number of discrimination allegations likely corresponds
to the growing proportion of women in the workforce, coupled with the
rising percentage of women who continue to work while pregnant."5 In
2006, 59.4% of women 16 or older participated in the labor force. This
amounted to 70.2 million women.6 But the growing presence of women
l J.D. expected 2oo8, University of Kentucky. The author wishes to thank Professor
Robert G. Schwemm for his assistance in this project. The author also wishes to thank her
parents, without whose love and sacrifice none of this would be possible. Finally, the author
wishes to thank her husband-to-be, Andy Barber, for his unconditional love and support.
2 See Pregnancy Discrimination Charges, U.S. Equal Opportunity Commission, http://www.
eeoc.gov/stats/pregnanc.html.
3 See Nations Birth Rate Falls to Record Low, USA TODAY, Jun. 26, 2003, http://www.usato-
day.com/news/nation/zoo3-o6--26-birth-ratex.htm; see also U.S. Birth Rate Hits All-Time Low,
http://usgovinfo.about.com/cs/censusstatistic/a/aabirthrate.htm.
4 Stephanie Armour, Pregnant Workers Report Growing Discrimination, USA TODAY, Feb. 16,
2005, http://www.usatoday.com/money/workplace/2005-oz-16-pregnancy-bias-usat-x.htm.
5 Thomas H. Barnhard & Adrienne L. Rapp, The Impact of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
on the Workplace-From a Legal and Social Perspective, 36 U. MEM. L. REV. 93, 1 i6 (2005).
6 Household Data AnnualAverages, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat2.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2007).
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in the workforce may not translate into better workplace treatment.7
"[Pregnancy discrimination] charges are coming from a range of women,
from those in entry-level jobs as well as those in executive suites."8
In addition, pregnancy discrimination cases are costing corporations
more and more money. In fiscal year 1992, the EEOC collected $3.7 million
in pregnancy discrimination cases.9 In 2005, the amount collected rose to
$11.8 million." In fiscal year 2000, the amount collected peaked at $20.6
million." These amounts do not even include "monetary benefits obtained
through litigation."1 2 The escalation of pregnancy discrimination cases in
the United States indicates a need to address pregnancy discrimination in
the workplace and the laws that govern these issues.
This Note traces the legal rights afforded pregnant women by Title VII
and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. 3 Next, it addresses courts' efforts
to define gender-based discrimination and compares the standards used by
courts to determine who is "similarly situated" with pregnant employees.4
It discusses the flaws in each standard and recommends a model approach
for courts. 15 Finally, this Note examines the interests of pregnant employees
and their employers to find a balance between both parties' interests.
1 6
I. THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT
In an effort to eliminate pregnancy discrimination, Congress amended
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." This amendment, titled The
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, provides that discrimination "on the
basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions" constitutes
unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII.18 With the passage of the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act in 1978, Congress amended the definitional
section of Title VII as follows:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related
7 Barnhard & Rapp, supra note 5, at i16.
8 See Armour supra note 4.
9 Pregnancy Discrimination Charges, supra note 2.
1o Id.
ii Id.
12 Id.
13 See infra notes 17-29 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 30-1 1o and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 111-22 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 123-32 and accompanying text.
17 42 U.S.C. §2oooe(k) (2ooo).
18 Id.
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purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as
other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work
19
Title VII covers employers with 15 or more employees, including state and
local governments. 0 Title VII also applies to employment agencies and to
labor organizations, as well as to the federal government.,
"The [Pregnancy Discrimination Act] was designed to address the
stereotype that women are less desirable employees because they are
liable to become pregnant."2 2 The prohibition of pregnancy discrimination
provides many protections for pregnant women and their ability to obtain
maternity leave. As far as hiring, an employer cannot refuse to hire a
pregnant woman because of her pregnancy, pregnancy-related conditions,
or because of the prejudices of co-workers, clients, or customers. 3 After
being hired, if an employee is temporarily unable to perform her job due to
pregnancy, the employer must treat her the same as any other temporarily
disabled employee. 4
However, "employers are not obligated to give special treatment to
pregnant women."s For example, if the employer allows temporarily
disabled employees to modify tasks, perform alternative assignments, or
take disability leave or leave without pay, the employer also must allow an
employee who is temporarily disabled due to pregnancy to do the same.
There can be no disparate treatment among the two groups.
Pregnant employees must be permitted to work as long as they are able
to perform their jobs. 6 If an employee has been absent from work as a
result of a pregnancy-related condition and recovers, her employer may
not require her to remain on leave until the baby's birth. 7 An employer
may not have a rule that prohibits an employee from returning to work for a
predetermined length of time after childbirth.28 Employers must also hold
open a job for pregnancy-related absence the same length of time jobs are
held open for employees on sick or disability leave. 9
Although there are many protections in place for pregnant women,
these protections are difficult to interpret because it is the woman, not the
19 Id.
20 Id. § 2oooe(b).
21 Id.
22 Maria G. Danaher, Limited Light Duty Does Not Violate the Pregnanty Discrimination Act,
8 LAWYERS J. 2, 2 (2oo6).
23 See 42 U.S.C. §2oooe(k) (2ooo).
24 See id.
25 Danaher, supra note 18, at 2.
26 See generally 42 U.S.C. §zoooe(k).
27 See generally id.
28 See generally id.
29 See generally id.
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company, that has the ability to determine whether an activity is safe or
unsafe for the pregnancy. Oftentimes, a company's interpretation of what
is necessary for the pregnant woman is not the same as her interpretation.
Thus, balancing the two interests becomes a difficult task for courts.
The difficulty in balancing the woman's interests with that of the
company she works for is clearly illustrated in a situation involving light-
duty assignments. Many women choose to stay at work during pregnancy,
but request that their assignments be light-duty assignments. Employers
have difficulty addressing situations such as this. They must abide by
the protections given to pregnant women by allowing pregnant women to
continue working as long at they deem appropriate. To force a pregnant
woman to stop working due to her pregnancy would be unlawful under
the current laws. On the other hand, do the current laws necessarily require
employers to accommodate pregnant women by providing light-duty
assignments? The implications of such a requirement could severely affect
employers. Many employers specialize in an area limited to heavy-duty
work. Other employers might not have openings for light-duty positions
and will have to suffer a financial loss in order to divide the light-duty
work amongst an unnecessary amount of employees. What exactly is the
law that employers must follow when it comes to light-duty requests from
pregnant women?
II. LIGHT-DUTY ASSIGNMENTS IN THE WORKPLACE
A. Determining the Meaning of "Similarly Situated"
Audrey is employed as a local police officer. She is three months pregnant.
Although she originally planned on working through her pregnancy, her
physician recently informed her that she could cause serious harm to her
unborn child if she continues the physical activity generally required of
police officers, and accordingly, restricted her to light-duty work. For the
remainder of her pregnancy, Audrey must perform light-duty work or not
work at all.3"
Audrey's employer must decide whether to grant her light-duty
assignments, force her to use her sick leave, or terminate her for no longer
being able to meet the performance requirements of a police officer. The
employer is aware of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and understands
that the proper course of action would purport to treat Audrey the same
as other "similarly situated" police officers. Which employee does Audrey
resemble:
30 This hypothetical is similar to one provided in Jessica C. Manners, The Search for Afr
Troupe: The Need to Eliminate Comparison Groups in Pregnancy Discrimination Act Cases, 66 OHiO
ST. L. J. 209, 209-1o (2005).
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" John, an officer with heart disease, who was granted a six-month
leave of absence for cardiac bypass surgery;
" Robert, an officer suffering from a sprained ankle as a result of
playing basketball with some college friends, who was denied
light-duty assignments and must use sick leave or face unpaid
leave;
" Sarah, an officer injured on the job from a car chase that resulted
in her cruiser colliding with a telephone pole, who received light-
duty assignments and workers' compensation payments; or
" Tim, an officer who became permanently impaired and could no
longer perform the duties of a police officer, who was subsequently
released from the police force.
The answer is none of the above. Audrey's condition does not closely
resemble any of the other officers' conditions. Pregnancy is not comparable
to the severity of John's heart transplant. Pregnancy is also not similar
to either of the off-the-job or on-the-job injuries sustained by Robert or
Sarah. Audrey's pregnancy is also unlike the permanent impairment of
Tim.
Audrey's situation is fictional, but her story is common. The ambiguity
of the law that employers must follow when deciding light-duty requests
primarily rests in determining the appropriate group to compare pregnant
women to-the group that is most "similarly situated," as The Pregnancy
Discrimination Act mandates. As the example above illustrates, this is a
daunting task. "Because pregnancy is such a unique condition with no male
counterpart, courts constantly struggle with which employees are similar to
pregnant employees in their ability or inability to work."'" The following
cases demonstrate the courts' futile attempts to clarify the meaning of
"similarly situated."
B. Reeves v. Swift Transportation Co.
Ensley-Gaines v. Runyon32 used to provide employers in the Sixth Circuit
with the standard for "similarly situated." In Ensley-Gaines, the Sixth
Circuit defined "similarly situated" in terms of ability or inability to work.
33
Place of injury (on or off the job) did not define "similarly situated." If
an employee with an occupational injury and a pregnant employee could
perform similar tasks, the employer could not grant light-duty assignments
to the employee with an occupational injury and fail to grant the same for
the pregnant employee.
31 Id. at 210 (internal punctuation omitted).
32 Ensley-Gaines v. Runyon, too F3d 1220, 1226 (6th Cir. 1996).
33 Id.
2007-o8]
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But a recent decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals changed the
meaning of "similarly situated." In Reeves,34 the plaintiff, Amanda Reeves,
formerly worked for the employer, Swift Transportation Company (Swift)
as an over-the-road truck driver. She claimed that her employer unlawfully
terminated her when she became pregnant and brought an action alleging
disparate treatment in violation of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.3"
"Reeves started working for Swift around August 9, 2002."36 She was
informed that working as a truck driver would require physical activity such
as bending, climbing, and lifting. "[She] understood that her job could
require her... to push freight weighing up to 100 pounds with brute force",
and she further signed a form representing "that she could bear this level of
physical strain."37
"About three months after Reeves started working for Swift, on
November 2, 2002, she learned that she was pregnant."3 Her physician
restricted her to light work only, but Swift insisted that it had no light work
for her to do.39 After continual requests for light-duty assignments by
Reeves, and denials by Swift, Swift terminated Reeves on November 14,
2003, because it had no work for her to do.40
Swift claimed that Reeves was terminated pursuant to a pregnancy-blind
policy denying light-duty work to employees who could not perform the
heavy lifting and also were not injured on the job.4 1 Swift had maintained
a policy of providing light-duty work only to employees who had sustained
on-the-job injuries in order to accommodate their injuries and Swift's work
needs. 42 Such light-duty assignments included answering phones, entering
orders, filing and the like.
43
This case started in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Tennessee, which granted Swift summary judgment.' "The
district court noted that 'to hold otherwise would result in the Court
affording pregnant women more benefits and better treatment than other
employees, instead of equal benefits and the same treatment as intended
by the' Act."'4 Reeves appealed, and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed, holding that Swift's policy of granting light-duty assignments
34 Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., 446 E3d 637 (6th Cir. 2006).
35 See id. at 640.
36 Id. at 638.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 See id. at 639.
41 See id.
42 See id.
43 See id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
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only to workers who sustained job-related injuries was a legitimate, non-
pregnancy based reason for Reeves' discharge.' The court found that the
terms of the employer's light-duty policy do not support an inference of
pregnancy discrimination, as it treated all temporarily disabled employees
the same; the granting of light-duty assignments was contingent on the
existence of job-related injuries.47 The court further stated that Reeves did
not produce direct evidence that could prove that discrimination occurred
without requiring further inferences.4"
C. Urbano v. Continental Airlines
Reeves is supported by other decisions in the Fifth and Eleventh circuits.
The Fifth and Eleventh circuits rejected claims materially identical to
those in Reeves. In Urbano v. Continental Airlines, Mirtha Urbano worked
for Continental Airlines as a ticketing sales agent.49 In that capacity,
"she assisted customers with sales and checking-in passengers and their
baggage, often lifting loads in excess of twenty pounds."5' 0
About four years after she started working for Continental, Urbano
learned she was pregnant.51 Subsequently, "she began suffering low-back
discomfort and went to see her doctor.5" Her doctor ordered that she refrain
from lifting anything over twenty pounds during her pregnancy, so Urbano
requested to work in a Service Center Agent position, which does not
require lifting heavy loads.5 3 Continental denied Urbano's request "because
Continental's transitional duty policy grants light-duty assignments only to
employees who suffer an occupational injury."' As a result, Urbano was
forced to take unpaid medical leave. 5 She brought suit against the airline
for pregnancy discrimination, and the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas entered summary judgment for Continental.
6
"To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, a
plaintiff may prove her claim either through direct evidence, statistical
proof, or the test established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green."57
46 See id. at 640.
47 See id.
48 See id.
49 Urbano v. Continental Airlines, 138 F3d 204, 205 (5th Cir. 1998).
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id
55 Id
56 Id.
57 Id at 2o6; see generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 0973).
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The McDonnell Douglas test requires the plaintiff to show: (1) she was a
member of a protected class, (2) she was qualified for the position she lost,
(3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) that others similarly
situated were more favorably treated. s8
However, if the employer provides a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the employment action, the trier of fact must then "determine whether
plaintiff has proved that the defendant intentionally discriminated against
[her] because of [her sexl."5 9 The district court found that Urbano "failed
to meet the second prong of her prima facie case for disparate treatment"
because she could not provide evidence that she was qualified for transfer
into a light-duty position since she did not sustain a work-related injury.0
The Fifth Circuit unanimously agreed, stating that Continental treated
Urbano the same "as it would have treated any other worker who was
injured off the job. '61 The court found that Urbano's back injuries were not
caused by her work for Continental, and the airline's denial was based on
this determination; it was not based on a determination involving Urbano's
pregnancy.
6
Urbano involves a light-duty policy identical to that of Reeves, and the
final determination was the same as that of Reeves-there was no probative
evidence that the distinction between injuries sustained on the job and
those sustained off the job was a pretext for discrimination against pregnant
women and ruling for the plaintiff would have the effect of granting a right
of special treatment for pregnant employees. 63
D. Spivey v. Beverly Enterprises, Inc.
The Eleventh Circuit reached the same conclusion when evaluating
another materially identical light-duty policy.64 In Spivey, Michelle Spivey
"was employed on June 13, 1996, as a certified nurse's assistant at the
Boaz Health and Rehabilitation Center, which is owned and operated
by [Beverly Enterprises, Inc.]"' 65  Her primary duties "were to lift and
reposition patients, assist with patient baths and meals, and provide general
58 Urbano v. Continental Airlines, 138 E3d 204, 2o6 (5th Cir. 1998).
59 Id. (quoting St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993)).
60 Id. at 2o6.
61 Id.
62 See id.
63 Id. at 208.
64 See Spivey v. Beverly Enters., 196 F3d 1309, 1313 (1 ith Cir. 1999).
65 Id. at 1311.
[Vol. 96
PREGNANT WOMEN AND THEIR EMPLOYERS
patient care.' After Spivey learned that she was pregnant, she obtained a
doctor's restriction imposing a lifting limitation of 25 pounds.
67
Boaz, however, would not accommodate Spivey because its policy stated
that "employees were excused from meeting their job responsibilities
only if they qualified for modified duty, which was available exclusively to
employees who suffered from work-related injuries."' Boaz
reserve[d] modified duty for employees with occupational injuries because
there are only a limited number of light duty tasks available at any one
time. If light duty were made available to all employees without regard
to whether the injury was work-related, the light duty "positions" would
be depleted and unavailable when needed by employees with workers'
compensation restrictions.
69
Spivey sued her employer, Beverly Enterprises, Inc., claiming Boaz's
"provision of modified duty for employees injured on the job, but not for
pregnant employees, violated the Pregnancy Discrimination Act."70 Spivey
argued "that she should have been given the accommodation of modified
duty because she was as capable of performing the duties required of a
modified-duty assignment as non-pregnant employees who were injured
on the job."7' The court held that the employer, however, was under no
duty "to extend this accommodation to pregnant employees."7
Under the court's analysis, '[tihere are two types of discrimination
actionable under Title VII, disparate treatment and disparate impact.""
Proof of discriminatory intent is necessary for a plaintiff to succeed on a
disparate treatment claim, but no evidence is required under a disparate
impact claim.74 As for disparate treatment, the court found that Spivey
"failed to establish that she suffered from a differential application of work
rules."75 "Ignoring [Spivey]'s pregnancy would still have left [Boaz] with
an employee who suffered from a non-occupational injury."
'76
In addition to the disparate treatment claim, Spivey alleged that Boaz's
policy of providing modified duty only to employees who are injured on
the job has a disparate impact on pregnant employees.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 1312 n.i.
70 Id. at 1312.
71 Id. at 1311.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 1313.
7 Id.
76 Id. at 1314.
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Establishing a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination involves
two steps. First, the plaintiff must identify the specific employment practice
that allegedly has a disproportionate impact. Second, the plaintiff must
demonstrate causation by offering statistical evidence sufficient to show
that the challenged practice has resulted in prohibited discrimination."
The court determined that Spivey established the first element, but "failed
to present statistical evidence to demonstrate that this policy in practice
has a disproportionate impact on pregnant employees."
7 8
E. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp.
Unlike the Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits, the Tenth Circuit has
a different opinion about light-duty assignments. In Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., the EEOC sued
Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corporation ("Horizon") on behalf of four
charging parties. 9 The EEOC claimed Horizon "unlawfully denied the
charging parties and a group of similarly situated pregnant employees
modified-duty when they became unable to perform heavy lifting due to
their pregnancies."80 The company, like those in the cases discussed in
Parts B-D,supra, had a policy that only allowed modified duty to employees
injured on the job.8 '
Three of the four parties represented by the EEOC held the position
of Certified Nursing Assistant (CNA).s2 The job required that each CNA
be able to lift up to seventy-five pounds. 3 The fourth party represented
by the EEOC in this matter worked as an Activity Assistant."4 All four
parties became pregnant during their employment and were placed under
lifting restrictions by their physicians. 8 The parties requested, but were
not granted modified-duty assignments, and as a result, were unable to
perform their job duties. 86 They were all subsequently terminated, laid off,
or placed on unpaid leave of absence.8"
77 Id. (citing Armstrong v. Flowers Hosp., Inc., 33 F3d 13o8, 1314 (1ith Cit. 1994)).
78 SeeSpivey v. Beverly Enters., 196 E3d 1309, 1314 (1 ith Cir. 1999).
79 Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Horizon/CMA Healthcare Corp., 220
F3d 1184, 1188-89 (ioth Cir. zooo).
8o See id. at 1189.
81 See id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 1189-9o.
87 Id.
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The district court granted summary judgment to Horizon on the
disparate treatment claim, and dismissed the disparate impact claim.88
The EEOC appealed the summary judgment on the disparate treatment
claim.8 9 The parties conceded that the EEOC met its burden of showing
that the parties EEOC represented were protected-class members that
had suffered an adverse employment action when denied modified-duty
assignments." However, the district court found that the EEOC failed to
show that the parties it represented were both qualified for the modified-
duty position and that the parties "were treated less favorably than similarly
situated employees."'"
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit addressed both of these unsatisfied
elements of a prima facie case for discrimination. In order to adequately
address whether a prima facie case had been made by the EEOC, the
court considered the charging parties' qualifications for the modified-duty
positions sought.9 Specifically, the court considered whether "an employer
may defeat an [employee's] prima facie case by challenging the [employee's]
qualification for the position on grounds she has failed to meet an objective
qualification that is not essential to the performance of the job."93
The Tenth Circuit previously determined in Burrus v. United Telephone
Co. of Kansas,94 that an employer may not defeat a plaintiff's prima facie case
for discrimination by asserting that the plaintiff failed to satisfy subjective
hiring qualifications.9" The Burrus court reasoned that doing so would deny
the plaintiff the opportunity to demonstrate that those subjective hiring
criteria were a means to effect discriminatory action. 6 Regarding objective
hiring qualifications, the Horizon court correspondingly stated that "[the]
purpose behind the McDonnell Douglas prima facie burden is to require a
plaintiff to eliminate the most common legitimate reasons for the adverse
employment action suffered."97 The Horizon court further determined
that
a plaintiff's failure to meet employer-imposed objective qualifications
that have no relation to the performance of the job at issue is irrelevant at
the prima facie stage of the McDonnell Douglas inquiry because it does not
88 Id. at i 190.
89 Id.
90 See id. at 1192.
91 See id.
92 See id.
93 Id.
94 Burrus v. United Tele. Co. of Kan., 683 F2d 339 (ioth Cir. 1982).
95 See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., zo
F3d 1184, 1192 (ioth Cir. 2000) (citing Burms, 683 Ead at 342).
96 Id.
97 Id. at 1'93.
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compel the conclusion that the plaintiff suffers from an "absolute or relative
lack of qualifications."
' 98
The Horizon court found that "the relevant inquiry at the prima facie is not
whether an employee ... is able to meet all the objective criteria adopted
by the employer, but whether the employee has introduced some evidence
that she possesses the objective qualifications necessary to perform the
job sought." The Tenth Circuit found that the EEOC had satisfactorily
demonstrated that the parties it represented possessed the skills necessary
to perform the positions they sought, and therefore met their prima facie
burden to establish a case for discrimination. 00
Subsequently, Horizon made the argument that the parties represented
by the EEOC were not treated less favorably than their non-pregnant
co-workers.101 However, Horizon assumed the pregnant women were
being compared to employees "temporarily disabled as a result of an injury
suffered off the job." ' Contrarily, the EEOC argued that the pregnant
women are most appropriately compared to "temporarily-disabled, non-
pregnant employees whether they sustained their injuries on or off the
job."103 While the court used Horizon's comparison of pregnant women
with employees temporarily disabled off the job, the court explained
that this is not necessarily the proper articulation of similarly situated
employees. 1 4 Alternatively, the court stated that other comparisons may
also be appropriate. 105
Ultimately, the court concluded that the EEOC established a prima
facie case of pregnancy discrimination by presenting sufficient evidence to
conclude that Horizon's reason for denying modified duty to the EEOC's
parties was pretextual.'06 However, this case differs slightly from the
cases previously discussed for two reasons. First, the EEOC presented
evidence that Horizon treated two non-pregnant employees who sustained
off-the-job injuries more favorably than pregnant employees. 07 Second,
genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the employer's
proffered reason for denying modified-duty assignments to pregnant
women was pretextual. 108 The Horizon court explained that "[a] plaintiff
98 Id.
99 Id.
oo Id. at 1194.
ioi Id.
1oz Id.
103 Id. at 1194-I 195.
io4 Id. at 1195 n.6.
105 Id.
1o6 Id. at 1200.
107 Id. at 1196.
io8 Id. at 1200.
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[can] establish[] pretext by revealing 'such weaknesses, implausibilities,
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's
proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could
rationally find them unworthy of credence.""" The EEOC successfully
showed that the employer's reason for its modified-duty policy-reducing
workers' compensation costs-was illegitimate because the company never
researched or inquired as to whether such a policy would actually reduce
those costs."' Thus, a modified-duty policy, the reasons for which are
uncorroborated by investigation or other findings, presents a genuine issue
of fact as to whether the policy is a pretext for discrimination.
III. COMPARING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: WHICH SIDE GETS IT RIGHT?
The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have been in agreement on the issue of
employer's light-duty policies."' Simply put, these circuits agree that if an
employer has a pregnancy-blind policy that does not treat pregnant women
different from other similarly situated employees, there is no violation of the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act."' The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits apply
this "similarly situated" rule, and identify temporarily disabled employees
injured off the job as the proper group with which to compare pregnant
women." 3 The Sixth Circuit, in the recent decision in Reeves, concurred
with the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits."
4
In the Tenth Circuit, the same rule applies, but a different group is
used with which to compare pregnant women when determining whether
discrimination exists." 5 The Tenth Circuit considers additional factors
such as (1) the possibility that pregnant women should be compared to the
treatment given to all temporarily disabled employees and not just those
injured off the job and (2) the corroboration between the policy and the
reasons the employer implemented such a policy."
6
Which side gets it right? It is a difficult task to balance both the interests
of pregnant women-many of which need to continue and are capable of
continuing their work when given modified tasks-and the interests of
employers that cannot bear the financial burden to grant pregnant workers
light-duty assignments, or could not function if pregnant women were
109 Id. at 1 198 (citing Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F3d 1301, 1317 (loth Cir.
1999)).
iio See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Horizon/CMA Healthcare Corp.,
22o E3d 1184, 1197 (loth Cir. 2000).
ill See Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., 446 E3d 637, 642 (6th Cir. zoo6).
112 See id.
I13 Id.
114 Reeves, 446 E3 d 642.
115 Horizon, zo F3 d 1184, 1194-95 (loth Cir. zooo).
ii6 Id. at 1195 n.7.
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required to be given light-duty assignments. In determining the more
accurate, less discriminatory approach, we must examine factors such as
inherent discrimination and policy implications.
A. Inherent Discrimination
When examining the correct group with which to compare pregnant
women, the Tenth Circuit has the most defensible position. Employers
that implement policies that only allow light-duty assignments to
employees injured on the job is inherently discriminatory against pregnant
women. Under such policies, it is clear that no pregnant woman will ever
receive modified duties. Pregnant women usually cannot fall into the
classification of "injured on the job" because pregnancy is an ongoing,
temporary disability that does not usually have a strong relationship to a
discrete, on-the-job accident or occurrence. Therefore, this is a way for
employers who do not want to provide such accommodations for pregnant
women to avoid violating the Pregnancy Discrimination Act in the Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits.
The Tenth Circuit's additional consideration of the employer's true
intention in implementing such a policy is worth noting. An examination
of intent clarifies whether a policy is needed or whether it does not serve
a rational purpose. If a policy that favors employees injured on the job
over those injured off the job does not serve a rational purpose, and is also
inherently discriminatory toward pregnant women, then the policy should
be void for public policy reasons. The capacity in which an employee
sustained an injury has no relevance as to his/her qualification to complete
the modified duties. Such a policy is not "pregnancy-blind" because
pregnant women can never fall into the "injured on the job" category
and employers are aware of that. Employers may not be able to predict
where injuries will occur (on of off the job), but they can be certain that by
establishing a Reeves, Urbano, or Spivey policy, they will owe no obligation
to pregnant women. This is inherently discriminatory, and to remedy this
problem, the Tenth Circuit looked to the reasoning behind potentially
discriminatory policies. The court established by implication a two-part
test:
(1) the court must look to see whether, under the circumstances, the proper
group with which to compare pregnant women is all temporarily disabled
employees or temporarily disabled employees injured off the job; and
(2) the court looks at the relationship between the policy and the employer's
reasoning for implementing such policy.
117
117 Id. at 1195-98 (This test is extrapolated from the courts' opinion and is not put forth
by the court as such an explicit test).
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Unlike the test applied by the Fifth, Eleventh, and now Sixth Circuits,
the first part of the Horizon test does not exclusively compare pregnant
women with temporarily disabled employees injured on the job.'18 There
may be situations when a court feels that the more appropriate group with
which to compare pregnant women is all temporarily disabled employees.
Under the Tenth Circuit's test, a court may select the more appropriate
comparison group. The test in the Fifth, Eleventh, and Sixth Circuits allows
no room for such discretion. Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit's application
serves as a caution to employers. Employers cannot be certain, under the
Tenth Circuit's rule, that a policy will pass muster if it is not discriminatory
when compared only to temporarily disabled employees injured off the
job. Therefore, employers are encouraged to take further precautions to
ensure that they limit light-duty work by using a method that is narrowly
tailored.
The second part of the Tenth Circuit's test looks at the employers'
motivation for implementation of their policy.'19 An inquiry into employers'
motivation for implementing a modified-duty policy distinguishes between
those with legitimate and illegitimate purposes. Only employers who can
identify legitimate business objectives will pass muster. Contrarily, the
Fifth, Eleventh, and Sixth Circuits' test sends employers the message that
as long as they develop a policy that is not discriminatory when comparing
pregnant women to other temporarily disabled employees injured off the
job, their policy will be upheld regardless of the impact it may have on
pregnant women or the intent to discriminate by the employer. It provides
an easy method by which employers may knowingly discriminate against
pregnant employees without fear of liability. In sharp contrast, the Horizon
test enforces liability where illegitimate discriminatory intent lies by
looking beyond an employer's alleged intent.
B. Policy Implications of Requiring Employers
to Grant Light-Duty Assignments
According to the U.S. Department of Labor, women made up 46.4% of
the workforce in 2004.120 Thus, employers may be hard hit, especially if
they have a large number of women who request light-duty assignments.
Productivity can suffer and there can be extra work for co-workers that are
forced to pick up the slack. Granting light-duty assignments may have a
particular effect on three main groups: (1) small businesses, (2) businesses
118 Id. at 1195-98.
I19 Id. at I197-98.
i2o Employment Status of the Civilian Noninstitutional Population by Age and Sex, U.S.
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-tablel-zoo5.
pdf.
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that typically employ women of child-bearing age, and (3) businesses with
critical times.
Small businesses have fewer employees to pick up the slack when
pregnant employees request light-duty assignments. Although the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of Title VII applies to employers with 15
or more employees, there are still small businesses that Title VII does
apply to. Some small businesses (e.g. 16 employees), unlike their larger
counterparts, may have very little light-duty work to accommodate the
needs of pregnant employees. To require that they provide light-duty
assignments to pregnant women could possibly put them out of business!
Employers would find themselves "creating" unnecessary tasks just
to provide pregnant women with work. Title VII and The Pregnancy
Discrimination Act were not likely meant to go so far.
Businesses that typically employ women of child-bearing age may also
be victims of a requirement to grant light-duty work to pregnant women.
For example, nursing home and hospitals are staffed by many women of
child-bearing age. Much of the work is not light duty. Cases previously
discussed involved situations where nurses were unable to perform their
duties that included rolling patients over, lifting patients, or pushing
wheelchairs.1"' Can nursing homes and hospitals staffed mostly with women
of child-bearing age function if they had to provide light-duty assignments
to all pregnant women? When a job depends on the performance of heavy-
duty work, and there is the potential that most of your employees of child-
bearing age will request light-duty work. Necessarily, the employer risks
not having enough employees capable of completing all the heavy-duty
work that needs to be done. And, as mentioned before by employers, there
is only so much light-duty work that needs to be done. For employers
to spend time "creating light-duty assignments" in order to satisfy The
Pregnancy Discrimination Act would in essence be giving pregnant women
preferential treatment."'2
Businesses with critical time constraints are in the same situation as
the two previous groups. Post offices and package carriers, particularly
around the holiday season, are examples of industries that need their
employees to be able to participate in heavy-duty activity during certain
integral times of the year. Employers can suffer financial and productivity
consequences if they hire a woman who needs light-duty assignments
when the business demand is at its peak. Thus, there are severe policy and
business implications of regulating employer modified--duty policies.
121 See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Horizon/CMA Healthcare Corp.,
220 F3d 1184, 1189 (ioth Cit. zooo); Spivey v. Beverly Enterps., Inc., 196 F3d 1309, 1311
(i ith Cir. 1999).
122 See Urbano v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 138 F3d 204, 2o8 (5th Cir. 1998).
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IV. MODEL POLICY
The two factors discussed above, inherent discrimination and policy
implications, are of emphasis when forming a proper test for courts to apply.
The test must be clear and courts must be able to apply it consistently.
It must protect the interests of Title VII and prohibit discrimination
against pregnant women when compared with a proper, similarly situated
group. And, it must not burden employers so much that they will face
insurmountable economic hardship. In light of these considerations it
seems that the proper test is one similar to the Tenth Circuit's in Equal
Opportunity Commission v. Horison/CMS Hea/thcare Corp.
123
However, a problem that exists with this test is that courts cannot be
trusted to select which comparison group to use. The difficulty in allowing
courts to pick and choose whether pregnant women should be compared
to all temporarily disabled employees or just those injured off the job lies
in the fact that courts may arbitrarily decide whether to apply an easier or
stricter standard on certain employers. Furthermore, the standard would
be ambiguous and employers would not be able to predict which standard
would be applied to them if courts determined this factor on a case-by-
case basis. Better procedure would be to establish a two-part balancing
test that examines (1) discriminatory impact and (2) discriminatory intent.
First, courts should determine whether there is discriminatory impact
through consideration of a number of factors. Courts can compare the
number of pregnant women denied light-duty requests, the number
of temporarily disabled employees injured off the job who are denied
light-duty requests, and the number of temporarily disabled employees
injured on the job who are denied light-duty requests. These numbers
may indicate inconsistency in the employer's policy and show, for instance,
that temporarily disabled employees injured off the job had in fact been
granted light-duty assignments.
Courts could also consider whether the complaining pregnant employee
was qualified to perform the work she was denied. If not, then there is no
discriminatory impact because her denial would not be based on pregnancy
as much as her lack of qualification. Courts should also look at whether
the pregnant woman denied work actually suffered any harm. A pregnant
woman could apply for light-duty assignments not knowing whether she
will actually work if granted light-duty assignments. In a situation such as
this where the pregnant woman has no intention of working and does not
suffer any hardship from not working, there may not be any impact from
the denial.
The discriminatory impact prong of this test is a threshold determination,
much like standing. Courts must determine whether discrimination and
123 Horizon, 22o F3d at 1195-98.
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harm result from the employer's policy and whether a court could properly
remedy the problem. This threshold determination satisfies the interests
of Title VII and pregnant women.
Second, courts should determine whether there is discriminatory intent.
This prong satisfies the interest of employers as discussed supra Part III-B.
Where an employer faces unreasonable economic hardship by providing
light-duty work to pregnant employees, courts will be less likely to find
discrimination.
In Troupe v. May Department Stores Co.,' 24 an employer successfully
asserted a business justification defense. 12 5 In Troupe, the Eleventh Circuit
held that an employer who terminated a pregnant employee because of
fear that she would not return after her pregnancy leave, and wanted to
avoid paying the costs of her maternity leave, constituted a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason for her termination.1 16 It follows that these economic
factors play an important role in determining whether an employer intended
for the policy to be discriminatory or if the employer had a legitimate
interest in implementing such a policy."2 7
Courts should balance discriminatory impact and discriminatory intent
to make a final determination as to whether the employer's policy should be
upheld. This balancing test would deter employers from creating potentially
discriminatory policies because it does not give employers sweeping
protection as do the tests in Reeves,"8 Urbano,129 and Spivey. 3' Neither does
it require employers to grant light-duty regardless of the potential burden
on the employer, as could occur with the Ensley-Gaines3' standard. Nor
does it grant courts broad authority to pick and choose different tests to
apply to what may be identical facts. 132 It is truly a "balancing" test and is
the proper test to apply in the many pregnancy discrimination cases that
continue to flood the courts.
124 Troupe v. May Dept. Stores Co., 2o F3d 734 (1 ith Cir. 1994).
125 Section 703(a)(2) codifies a defense to pregnancy discrimination. "If a company's
business necessitates the adoption of particular leave policies, Title VII does not prohibit the
company from applying these policies to all leaves of absence, including pregnancy leaves;
Title VII is not violated even though the policies may burden female employees." Nashville
Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 US 136, 143 (1977) (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431
(1971)).
126 Troupe, 20 E3d at 737-38.
127 Further discussion of the advantages of this factor can be found in supra notes I 17-
19 and accompanying text.
128 Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., 446 E3d 637 (6th Cir. 2oo6).
129 Urbano v. Continental Airlines, 138 E3d 204 (5th Cir. 1998).
130 Spivey v. Beverly Enters., 196 F3d 1309 (1 ith Cir. 1999).
131 Ensley-Gaines v. Runyon, ioo F3d 1zzo (6th Cir. 1996).
132 This is the problem identified with the Tenth Circuit's test in Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm'n v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 22o F 3 d 1184 (Ioth Cir. 2ooo), and is
discussed in supra Part II-E.
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